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LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES:                 
THE BELFAST PROJECT LITIGATION AND 
THE NEED FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO 
RECOGNIZE AN ACADEMIC PRIVILEGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Kathryn L. Steffen* 
INTRODUCTION 
“History must not be a weapon against those trying to 
seize the opportunity of today to build a more 
promising tomorrow.”1 
Senator John F. Kerry  
In the United States, we hail the freedom of expression and 
the right to education as cornerstones of our democracy. Under our 
belief system, academia is the oasis in an ever-changing world where 
people from various backgrounds flock to freely exchange 
information. Not only is this exchange of information intrinsically 
valuable, but it also has extrinsic worth. History is compiled through 
the shared experiences of others and becomes a guide to creating a 
better future when new generations heed the lessons of the past. 
However, the Supreme Court recently denied a controversial petition 
for writ of certiorari, which presented the Court with an opportunity 
to solidify and protect these ideals by recognizing a constitutional 
privilege for academic researchers. 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania 
State University, 2014 
1 John Kerry, Op-Ed, Irish Future Shouldn’t Get Lost in Violent Past, 
BOSTON HERALD, April 4, 2012, 
http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/category/congressional-
action/senator-kerry-op-ed-unedited/ [hereinafter Kerry Op-Ed]. 
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In 2001, researchers sponsored by Boston College began to 
compile an oral history of “The Troubles,” a decades-long period of 
violent political conflict in Northern Ireland.2 Through this oral 
history, titled the Belfast Project, the researchers hoped to gain 
insight into the thought processes of individuals who become 
personally engaged in violent conflict by interviewing people who 
took up arms during “The Troubles.”3 The interviewees’ participation 
was conditioned on a strict promise of confidentiality.4 
Based on its suspicion that the interviews contained evidence 
of criminal activity,5 the United Kingdom requested that the United 
States subpoena the controversial materials on its behalf, pursuant to 
a mutual legal assistance treaty.6 Boston College and the individual 
researchers involved in the Belfast Project challenged the subpoena, 
asserting an academic privilege that would allow them to protect 
confidential information from compelled disclosure.7 The First 
Circuit denied the existence of this privilege,8 and the lead Belfast 
Project researchers petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari in November 2012.9 The Supreme Court denied the 
                                                 
2 In re Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d 435, 440 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 685 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2012).   
3 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4; Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 
F.Supp.2d at 440.   
4 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5 (explaining that interviewees 
were required to contract with Boston College to protect their anonymity).   
5 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 452. 
6 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3, 12. Generally, mutual legal 
assistance treaties allow for the state parties to exchange evidence and information 
about criminal matters. BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AFFAIRS, 2012 INCSR: Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Mar. 7, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.htm. 
7 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 453. 
8 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 16. 
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 37, Moloney v. United States, No. 12-
627 (petition for cert. denied April 15, 2013). 
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petition in April 2013,10 and the case returned to the First Circuit, 
which limited the amount of interview materials to be surrendered.11 
Anthony McIntyre,12 one of the lead researchers, also 
petitioned the High Court in Belfast to protect the interviews from 
compelled disclosure.13 The sitting judge dismissed the case upon his 
belief that McIntyre’s life would not be jeopardized by satisfaction of 
the subpoena, and McIntyre expressed his intention to appeal.14 
This comment argues that compelling academics to disclose 
confidential information significantly obstructs the free flow of 
information that is essential to a thriving democratic society. Through 
the lens of the Belfast Project controversy, this comment examines 
the state of an academic privilege in American jurisprudence and then 
advocates that the U.S. adopt the reasoning of the European Court 
of Human Rights when the right to freedom of expression is 
implicated. A license to disregard confidentiality agreements would 
imperil all individuals involved in high-intensity research and would 
threaten to tarnish the integrity of academic endeavors. 
At first blush, the United States appears to be the ideal forum 
to champion researchers’ rights. However, considering the applicable 
law and the context of the Belfast Project, had certiorari been 
granted, the Supreme Court likely would have found against the 
researchers and declined to recognize an academic privilege. Instead, 
this issue should be more favorably litigated in the United Kingdom, 
where the European Convention on Human Rights applies. Finally, if 
                                                 
10 Boston College Project: PSNI Get Dolours Price Interviews Access, BBC, Apr. 
15, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22158392. 
11 The Belfast Project, Boston College, and a Sealed Subpoena, BOSTON COLLEGE 
SUBPOENA NEWS, http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/ (last visited 
January 8, 2013)(“The ruling reduced the amount of material to be handed over 
from 85 interviews (roughly half of the archive) to segments of 11 interviews.”). 
12 McIntyre’s role in the Belfast Project and the subsequent litigation is 
explained in depth infra Part I.A.2.  
13 McIntyre Loses IRA Tapes Case, UTV (Oct. 2, 2012), 
http://www.u.tv/News/McIntyre-loses-IRA-tapes-case/7a7ec609-006e-4608-
870e-a44a393e7104. 
14 Id. This decision was based on Article 2 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights, not on Article 10, the focus of this comment. At the time of 
writing, there has been no update given about the anticipated appeal. 
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the researchers are unsuccessful in both American and European 
courts, the comment suggests that the U.S. Secretary of State should 
decline to enforce the British authorities’ request because it 
contravenes public policy. 
I. THE BELFAST PROJECT 
A. Purpose and Design of the Belfast Project 
1.  The purpose of the Belfast Project 
In 2001, Boston College initiated its sponsorship of the 
Belfast Project,15 an oral history project dedicated to gathering and 
preserving the recollections of members of the paramilitary 
organizations actively engaged in both the Republican and Loyalist 
sides of the conflict during “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland from 
1969 forward.16 
“The Troubles” refers to the violent conflict between the 
Republican Nationalists and the Loyalist Unionists that plagued 
Northern Ireland from 1969 until 1998,17 when the parties finally 
reached the Good Friday Agreement.18 The seeds of “The Troubles” 
were planted in 1920, when Great Britain granted home rule to 
Northern Ireland, releasing it from its former dependence on 
London.19 Protestant Unionists who wanted Northern Ireland to 
remain unified with Great Britain comprised the majority of the 
Northern Irish population.20 Contrarily, the Nationalist, mainly 
Catholic, minority wanted to unite Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland to create an all Irish state.21 “Republican” and 
                                                 
15 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440. Boston College has a 
continued academic interest in Irish Studies. The College was also involved in the 
peace process in Northern Ireland, following “The Troubles.” 
16 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4 (1st Cir. 2012); Trs. of Boston 
Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d 435 at 440 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).  
17 Lorenzo Bosi, Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army, 1969-1972, 36 SOC. SCI. HIST. 347, 356 (2012).  
18 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26-27.  
19 Bosi, supra note 17, at 355. 
20 Id. at 378. 
21 Id. at 355, 378. 
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“Loyalist” are the terms given to those sympathizers who were 
prepared to use political violence to further their respective causes.22 
Tensions erupted in 1969 when interactions between 
Nationalist civil rights activists, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 
and the Loyalist countermovement became violent.23 The violence 
spread rapidly to Belfast, where Nationalists were a distinct 
minority.24 There, the RUC and Loyalist mobs attacked the 
Nationalist communities, hoping to quell an anticipated Nationalist 
rebellion.25 Considering the worsening upheaval in Northern Ireland, 
the British Government ended its longstanding policy of non-
involvement and deployed British troops to restore order in 
Northern Ireland.26 The Republicans and Loyalists took up arms to 
protect their interests, characterizing the tense and violent political 
climate of Northern Ireland until the Good Friday Agreement in 
1998.27 
In addition to creating a historical account of “The 
Troubles,” the Boston College researchers also aspired to gain insight 
into the personality and mindset of an individual who engages in 
violent conflict.28 According to the project’s creators, the Belfast 
Project is a vital step toward understanding not only the conflict in 
Northern Ireland, but also the dynamics of conflicts worldwide.29 
                                                 
22 Id. at 378. 
23 Bosi, supra note 17, at 355. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was 
the state police force in Northern Ireland from 1922 until the initiation of the 
Good Friday Agreement reforms, and it was closely associated with the British 
government during “the Troubles.” Per the Good Friday Agreement, the RUC was 
renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland in 2001. Royal Ulster Constabulary, in 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/511633/Royal-Ulster-
Constabulary-RUC (last updated June 11, 2013). 
24 Bosi, supra note 17, at 356. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. passim. 
28 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440. 
29 Id. 
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2.  The Belfast Project’s design evinces the importance of confidentiality 
Because of the continuing sensitivity and danger 
characterizing the conflict in Northern Ireland,30 the Belfast Project’s 
structure was essential to its success.31 Ed Moloney, the journalist and 
writer who initially proposed the project, entered into an agreement 
with Boston College to become the project’s director.32 Moloney’s 
contract required him to ensure that the interviewers and 
interviewees signed and adhered to a strict confidentiality 
agreement.33 The agreement prohibited all participants from 
disclosing the existence and scope of the project without the 
permission of Boston College.34 Furthermore, the contract mandated 
that interviewers use a coding system when documenting their 
research to protect the anonymity of interviewees.35 Only Ed 
Moloney and Robert K. O’Neill, the librarian of the Burns Library 
where the project was stored, had access to the coding system’s key.36 
Therefore, they were the only persons able to identify the 
interviewees.37 
                                                 
30 See id. at  441 (indicating that, because of the continued tensions in 
Northern Ireland, the Belfast Project leaders determined that the interviews could 
not safely be housed in Ireland). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, 
at 9 (discussing a report from the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, stating 
that there are significant risks to the lives of people who are publicly revealed to be, 
or suspected of being, paramilitary informants). 
31 See Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441 (“In general, Boston 
College believes that interviewees conditioned their participation on the promises 
of strict confidentiality and anonymity”). 
32 Id. at 440. 
33 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4. 
34 Id. at 4-5. 
35 Id. at 5.  
36 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440-41. Boston College’s Burns 
Library of Rare Books and Special Collections houses many valuable documents. 
Id. at 440. In July 2013, it was reported that Boston College might have lost the 
coded keys to the Belfast Project interviews, rendering the interviewees 
unidentifiable. Ed Moloney denies responsibility for the mistake. Jim Dee, Boston 
Tapes Gaffe: Confessions May Be Useless After Identity Codes Lost, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, 
July 29, 2013, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-
ireland/boston-tapes-name-gaffe-confessions-may-be-useless-after-identity-codes-
lost-29455178.html.   
37 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441. 
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In addition to Moloney and O’Neill, the Belfast Project 
employed two researchers to interview members of paramilitary 
groups associated with both sides of the conflict.38 Antony McIntyre, 
the Lead Project Researcher39 who himself was a former member of 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA),40 entered into a contract with 
Moloney, which was governed by the same terms as Moloney’s 
contract with Boston College.41 Under the contract’s terms, McIntyre 
was likewise legally bound to protect the privacy of the project and 
the identities of its subjects.42 By the project’s end in 2006, McIntyre 
had conducted twenty-six interviews of individuals associated with 
the Republican side of the conflict in Northern Ireland.43 
Interviewees also contracted with Boston College to protect 
their anonymity and the contents of their interviews.44 Specifically, 
interviewees signed donation agreements, which transferred 
possession and absolute title to their interview recordings and 
transcripts to Boston College upon their deaths.45 The following 
clause contained in the donation agreements restricts access to the 
interview materials: 
Access to the tapes and transcripts shall be restricted 
until after my death except in those cases where I 
have provided prior written approval for their use 
following consultation with the Burns Librarian, 
Boston College. Due to the sensitivity of the content, 
the ultimate power of release shall rest with me. After 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 2. 
40 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5. 
41 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441. 
42 See id. (explaining that Moloney’s contract prohibited him from 
disclosing the existence or scope of the Belfast Project to anyone without the 
permission of Boston College. Additionally, Moloney was required to use a strict 
coding system to preserve the interviewees’ anonymity). 
43 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5 (noting that the Belfast Project 
ended in 2006. In total, the Belfast Project is comprised of a forty-one interview 
series, each of which may contain multiple interviews with the same individual). 
44 See id.  
45 Id. (explaining that the donation agreement included a provision that 
also transferred the rights to whatever copyright an interviewee may own in the 
contents of the interview). 
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my death, the Burns Librarian of Boston College may 
exercise such power exclusively.46 
Per the agreement, only the signing participant has the 
authority to release information pertaining to his or her interview.47 
Neither the interviewer nor Boston College was permitted to disclose 
the identities of the participants or the contents of their interviews 
until the interviewees either gave permission or died.48 Therefore, the 
Belfast Project researchers assumed a duty of confidentiality to 
protect the identities of the participants and the contents of the 
interviews. 
B. Litigation Surrounding the Belfast Project 
In 2011, two sets of subpoenas requesting information related 
to the Belfast Project were issued to Boston College49 on behalf of 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland50 pursuant to the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty between the United States and the United 
Kingdom (US-UK MLAT).51 The US-UK MLAT, which was signed 
in 1994, is a bilateral treaty intended to improve law enforcement 
cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.52 A 
request for a subpoena under the US-UK MLAT is a direct request 
by the Executive Branch on behalf of a foreign power—in this case, 
on behalf of the United Kingdom.53 
                                                 
46 Id. (noting that this quoted portion of the agreement was executed by 
Brendan Hughes, a deceased interviewee). Although the other interviewees’ 
agreements were not part of the record, the First Circuit reasonably extrapolated 
that each interviewee signed the same agreement. 
47 Id. at 5-6. 
48 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5- 6. 
49 See id. at 3. 
50 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 1. 
51 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3, 12 (noting that the statutory 
authority to be applied as the procedural mechanism for executing subpoenas 
under the US-UK MLAT is codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3512). Section 3512 was 
enacted as part of the Foreign Evidence Request Efficacy Act of 2009. This is the 
first court of appeals decision to interpret a mutual legal assistance treaty and § 
3512 together. 
52 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 442. 
53 Id. at 452.  
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According to the United Kingdom, the requested information 
from the Belfast Project is connected to the abduction and murder of 
Jean McConville, which occurred in 1972.54 McConville was believed 
to be an informant to the British, making her a prime target for the 
Republicans in Northern Ireland during “The Troubles.”55 
The first set of subpoenas, issued in May 2011, requested the 
recorded interviews and documents associated with interviewees 
Brendan Hughes and Dolours Price,56 two former IRA members.57 
The May 2011 subpoenas did not mention McConville specifically.58 
Rather, the request stated that the materials were needed to assist the 
United Kingdom’s investigation of alleged crimes.59 Boston College 
supplied the information associated with Brendan Hughes because 
his confidentiality was not at issue, as he died prior to the request.60 
However, the College moved to quash or modify the subpoena for 
information related to Dolours Price, who was still living at the 
time.61 
Later, in August 2011, Boston College was served with 
another set of subpoenas requested by the United Kingdom pursuant 
to the US-UK MLAT, this time demanding the recordings, 
transcripts, and records of all interviews containing information 
about the death and abduction of Jean McConville.62 Boston College 
promptly moved to quash the August 2011 set of subpoenas as well.63 
                                                 
54 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.  
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 3; Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440. 
57 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 11. 
58 See Request From the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6. 
59 Id. (listing the crimes under investigation as murder, conspiracy to 
murder, incitement to murder, aggravated burglary, false imprisonment, 
kidnapping, and causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause such harm).  
60 Id. at 3. 
61 Id.; Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440. Dolours Price passed 
away in January 2013. Paul Vitello, Dolours Price, Defiant I.R.A. Bomber, Dies at 61, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/europe/dolours-price-defiant-ira-
bomber-dies-at-61.html. 
62 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441. 
63 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3. 
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In support of its motions to quash, Boston College asserted 
an academic privilege, arguing that the First Circuit has recognized 
protections for confidential academic research material64 and that 
those protections apply to the information at issue.65 Under the case 
law of the First Circuit, a subpoena to obtain information from a 
confidential source in a criminal case implicates First Amendment 
concerns and, therefore, calls for a balancing of considerations before 
it is executed.66 The general rule is that confidential information 
cannot be compelled from a reporter or an academician unless it is 
directly relevant to a serious claim made in good faith, and the same 
information is not available from a less sensitive source.67 If these 
threshold conditions are met, a court must then balance the 
government’s need for the evidence against the risk of potential harm 
to the free flow of information between informants and academicians 
if confidentiality is broken. 
The District Court of Massachusetts denied the existence of 
an academic privilege, but proceeded to apply the case law of the 
First Circuit to determine if the subpoenas should be executed.68 The 
district court found that, although the targeted materials were indeed 
confidential, they were relevant to a serious claim, requested in good 
faith, and were not available from a less sensitive source.69 Next, the 
district court conducted the balancing test and found that the 
considerations weighed strongly in favor of disclosing the 
confidential information to the government.70 
Ed Moloney and Anthony McIntyre moved to intervene, 
claiming an interest not only in defending their pledge of 
confidentiality, but also in guarding their personal safety and the 
                                                 
63. Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 453. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 457.  
69 Id. at 456. 
70 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4 (noting Boston College appealed 
the order regarding the August subpoenas, but it did not appeal the order regarding 
the May subpoena requesting the interviews of Dolours Price. Presently, the 
Boston College portion of the litigation is over, and only Moloney and McIntyre’s 
claims continue); Tr. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 457. 
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safety of their sources.71 The district court denied the motion to 
intervene on the ground that Moloney and McIntyre did not have a 
private right of action under the US-UK MLAT.72 Furthermore, the 
district court concluded that Boston College adequately represented 
any interests that Moloney or McIntyre may have relating to their 
involvement in the Belfast Project.73 
After the district court denied their motion to intervene, 
Moloney and McIntyre filed an original complaint, which the district 
court dismissed for the same reasons it denied their motion to 
intervene.74 Moloney and McIntyre appealed to the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit, challenging the district court’s denial of their 
motion to intervene75 and the dismissal of their original complaint.76 
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling as it 
pertained to a private right of action.77 The Court held that Moloney 
and McIntyre could not assert a legally cognizable claim under the 
US-UK MLAT because the treaty specifically disclaims the existence 
of a private right of action upon which relief can be granted.78 
Furthermore, the First Circuit dismissed Moloney and McIntyre’s 
claim of academic privilege under the First Amendment, holding that 
the Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972), was controlling.79 
                                                 
71 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 458. 
72 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 7, 8 (explaining that Article 1 of 
the US-UK MLAT specifically states that the Treaty is intended solely for mutual 
legal assistance between the United States and the United Kingdom, and that the 
Treaty does not give rise to a right of private action on the part of an individual to 
obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request). 
73 Id. at 7. 
74 Id. (assuming arguendo that Moloney and McIntyre had standing, the 
District Court dismissed their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
for failure to state a claim).  
75 Id. 
76 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4. 
77 Id. at 20. 
78 Id. at 13. 
79 Id. at 16 (noting that, in Branzburg, the Supreme Court rejected the 
existence of a reporters’ privilege. Branzburg is developed in sufficient detail in Part 
II). 
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In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that a reporter does not 
have the privilege to withhold information from criminal justice 
authorities in the face of a grand jury subpoena, even if the reporter 
has promised confidentiality to his source.80 Although Moloney and 
McIntyre were not claiming a press privilege, the First Circuit has 
established that academic researchers are entitled to the same 
protections that the law provides for journalists.81 Moreover, the First 
Circuit found that the rationale behind Branzburg, although it involved 
a reporter being subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, applied to 
Moloney and McIntyre’s action under the US-UK MLAT.82 
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that the government’s 
interest in law enforcement outweighed the risk that compelling the 
press to disclose confidential sources would freeze the free flow of 
communication.83 Similarly, the First Circuit explained that the US-
UK MLAT serves the strong law enforcement interests of the United 
States and the United Kingdom, and the court agreed with the district 
court’s holding that compelling the information from the Belfast 
Project would not severely inhibit the success of the Belfast Project 
or future academic endeavors.84 
                                                 
80 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972). See also Request from 
the U.K., 685 F.3d at 16.  
81 Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 
1998)(“Academicians engaged in pre-publication research should be accorded 
protection commensurate to that which the law provides for journalists[]”). 
82 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 16. 
83 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690. 
84 See Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 19. Branzburg and its progeny took the 
risk of the potential chilling effect into account and came to the same 
determination. In its application of the balancing test, the district court gave weight 
to the fact that the Belfast Project concluded in 2006, arguing that the subpoena 
would not inhibit the Belfast Project researchers to gain information. 
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II.  ACADEMIC PRIVILEGE IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Supreme Court Denied the Existence of a Journalists’ 
Privilege 
1.  The background of Branzburg v. Hayes 
To fully understand the progression of the Belfast Project 
litigation, one must first understand the important precedent set by 
the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes. In Branzburg, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide four separate appeals, each of 
which raised the proposition that the confidentiality of a reporter’s 
sources is privileged under the First Amendment.85 Specifically, the 
reporters asserting the privilege in Branzburg argued that their First 
Amendment rights were abridged when they were required to testify 
to confidential information before grand juries.86 
Two of the four appeals heard in Branzburg concerned 
publications by Petitioner-Branzburg, a staff reporter for a daily 
newspaper published in Louisville, Kentucky.87 On two occasions, 
Branzburg was subpoenaed to testify before grand juries in 
Kentucky, and he moved to quash the subpoenas each time on the 
grounds that, if required to testify, he would be forced to disclose 
information revealed to him in confidence.88 
In Branzburg’s first controversial story, he recounted his 
observations of two individuals synthesizing marijuana into hashish.89 
Shortly after the story’s publication, Branzburg was subpoenaed to 
testify as to the identities of the drug users before the grand jury.90 
Although he appeared before a county grand jury, Branzburg refused 
to name the individuals he saw in possession of the drugs.91 
Branzburg claimed that his refusal to answer was authorized by the 
                                                 
85 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.  
86 Id. at 667.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 668-70. 
89 Id. at 667; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 345-36 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1970). 
90 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 346. 
91 Id. 
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First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in addition to 
other laws.92 The trial court disagreed and required Branzburg to 
answer.93 Thereafter, Branzburg sought prohibition and mandamus 
from the Kentucky Court of Appeals on the same grounds, but the 
court denied his petitions.94 
Branzburg’s second appeal was sparked by a later story 
describing the use of drugs in another Kentucky town.95 While 
researching the story, Branzburg spent two weeks interviewing drug 
users.96 Once more, Branzburg was summoned to appear before a 
county grand jury to testify about the statutory violations concerning 
the sale and use of drugs, to which he was made privy.97 Branzburg’s 
motion to quash the subpoena was denied.98 Branzburg then 
petitioned the court of appeals for writs of prohibition and 
mandamus, as he had in his earlier case concerning the use of drugs.99 
Again, Branzburg’s petitions were denied.100 
The next judgment under review in Branzburg was In re 
Pappas.101 Petitioner-Pappas was a television newsman and a 
photographer for a Massachusetts television station.102 Pappas was 
called to New Bedford, Massachusetts, to report on civil disorders in 
                                                 
92 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 347. 
The other laws under which Branzburg sought relief were the Kentucky reporters’ 
privilege statute (Ky.Rev.Stat. § 421.100) (1962)) and several sections of the 
Kentucky Constitution.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 668-69 (explaining that the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
interpreted Kentucky’s reporters’ privilege statute to afford a reporter the privilege 
of refusing to disclose the identity of an informant, but held that the statute did not 
authorize a reporter to refuse to testify about events he had observed personally, 
including the identities of those persons he had observed). 
95 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669; Branzburg v. Meigs, 530 S.W.2d 748, 749 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1971). 
96 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669. 
97 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669; Branzburg v. Meigs, 530 S.W.2d at 749. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 670. 
100 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 671. 
101 Id. at 672.  
102 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 (Mass. 
1971). 
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the area, which were related to activity of the Black Panther Party.103 
Pappas gained access to the Black Panther headquarters in the area, 
where he recorded and photographed a prepared statement read by 
one of the group’s leaders.104 The Black Panther leaders admitted 
Pappas to their meeting place on the strict condition that he 
promised not to disclose anything he heard or saw inside of the 
headquarters.105 
Two months later, Pappas was called before a county grand 
jury as part of an investigation into the criminal acts during the 
period of civil disorder on which he had reported in New Bedford.106 
Although he appeared and willingly answered questions regarding his 
name, address, employment, and observations outside of the Black 
Panther headquarters, Pappas refused to testify about his 
observations during his stay inside the headquarters.107 Like 
Branzburg, Pappas claimed that he, as a reporter, had a First 
Amendment privilege to protect confidential information he received 
in the course of investigative work.108 After Pappas refused to answer, 
he was served with a second summons to appear before the grand 
jury and to provide all evidence connected to the matters about 
which he was questioned.109 Pappas claimed a First Amendment 
                                                 
103 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672, 674; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298, 299. 
While reviewing Pappas’ case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took 
judicial notice that, in July 1970, New Bedford, Massachusetts, was rife with civil 
disorder, which included “street barricades, exclusion of the public from certain 
streets, and similar turmoil.” 
104 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298. The 
Black Panther headquarters was located in a boarded-up store. The streets 
surrounding the store were barricaded, but Pappas was eventually able to enter the 
area. 
105 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d. at 298 (noting 
that, per his agreement with the Black Panthers, Pappas was at liberty to 
photograph and report the anticipated police raid). 
106 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672-73, 674. The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts did not have a record of the hearing below, but the court assumed 
that the grand jury investigation at issue was an effort to identify and indict those 
responsible for the criminal acts that occurred during the period of civil disorder in 
New Bedford. 
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privilege and moved to quash the subpoena, but the trial court denied 
his motion.110 
Reviewing Pappas’ appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts specifically rejected the holding of the Ninth Circuit in 
Caldwell v. United States, described below, and held that reporters do 
not have a constitutional privilege authorizing them to refuse to 
appear and testify before a court or a grand jury.111 Additionally, the 
court reaffirmed its prior holdings that testimonial privileges must be 
limited.112 According to Massachusetts’s precedent, the principle that 
the public has a right to every man’s evidence has traditionally 
outweighed competing interests.113 Furthermore, the court went on to 
conclude that any adverse effect on the free flow of news by 
requiring reporters to testify would be indirect, theoretical, and 
uncertain.114 
Finally, the last decision under the Supreme Court’s review in 
Branzburg was the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Caldwell.115 
Caldwell, a reporter for The New York Times, had written stories 
covering the Black Panthers and other black militant groups in 
California.116 In a fact pattern similar to that surrounding the Belfast 
Project litigation, Caldwell was subpoenaed to testify before a federal 
grand jury regarding various potential criminal violations committed 
by the militants.117 The first summons served on Caldwell ordered 
him to bring all notes and tape recordings from his interviews with 
the officers and spokespeople of the Black Panther Party regarding 
                                                 
110 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 673 (noting that, in contrast to Kentucky, 
Massachusetts did not have a statutory reporters’ privilege at the time of Pappas’s 
motion.) 
111 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03. 
112 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674. 
113 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 299-300. 
114 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674 (quoting In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 302) 
115 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675. 
116 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675; Caldwell v. U.S., 434 F.2d 1081, 1083 (9th 
Cir. 1970). 
117 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675-76, 677. Possible violations included 
threats against President Nixon, assassination, conspiracy to assassinate, and 
interstate travel to incite a riot. 
 
2014 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 3:1 
340 
the organization’s aims, purposes, and activities.118 After Caldwell 
objected to the scope of the subpoena, the government modified its 
request, calling only for the reporter to appear before the grand 
jury.119 
Caldwell and The New York Times moved to quash the 
subpoena, arguing that, if required to testify, Caldwell’s working 
relationship with the Black Panther Party would be destroyed, 
effectively suppressing essential First Amendment freedoms by 
chilling the flow of communication between the press and the 
militants.120 The District Court denied the motion to quash121 but 
instituted a protective measure allowing the journalist to refuse to 
disclose confidential information in the absence of a showing by the 
government of a compelling and overriding interest in disclosure.122 A 
second subpoena was issued, and Caldwell filed another motion to 
quash, which was subsequently denied.123 
In the face of the order, Caldwell refused to testify before the 
grand jury and was held in contempt of court.124 Caldwell appealed 
the contempt order, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that 
requiring a journalist to testify before a grand jury would dissuade 
informants from communicating with him in the future.125 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit recognized the potential chill to the 
free flow of information as a threat great enough to require the 
government to show necessity before compelling a reporter to appear 
before a grand jury.126 
                                                 
118 Id. at 675. 
119 Id. at 675-76. 
120 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 676; Caldwell, 434 F.3d at 1084. 
121 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 677. 
122 Id. at 678; Caldwell, 434 F.3d at 1083. 
123   . Id. (noting that, during the time the district court was reviewing 
Caldwell’s first motion to quash, the grand jury’s term expired, and a new grand 
jury was convened. After the second grand jury was assembled, the second 
subpoena was issued to Caldwell. Caldwell’s new motion to quash was submitted 
on the prior record). 
124 Id. 
125 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679; Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1084. 
126 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 697; Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1085-86. 
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The Ninth Circuit’s holding that requiring a reporter to testify 
would substantially deter future communications between the media 
and informants marked a stark split from the perspectives of the 
appellate courts in Branzburg I, Branzburg II, and Pappas, which found 
that any negative effect of requiring a journalist to disclose 
confidential information on the free flow of communication was 
tenuous and indirect.127 The Supreme Court granted the writ of 
certiorari to address the disputed journalists’ privilege claimed by 
Branzburg, Pappas, and Caldwell.128 
2.  Summary of the argument for a privilege before the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Branzburg v. Hayes 
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court considered the newsmen’s 
contention that a reporter should not be required to appear or testify 
before a grand jury or at a trial unless the government sufficiently 
shows that: (1) the reporter is privy to evidence relevant to the crime 
under investigation; (2) the evidence is not available from another 
source; and (3) the government’s need for the evidence is sufficiently 
compelling to outweigh the First Amendment interests at stake.129 
Journalists Petitioner-Branzburg, Petitioner-Pappas, and Respondent-
Caldwell each refused to respond to grand jury subpoenas and testify 
about evidence relevant to criminal investigations.130 Generally, 
citizens are not exempt from answering a grand jury subpoena;131 
however, a constitutional provision may authorize a citizen to refuse 
to appear and testify.132 
The Branzburg journalists submitted that the First 
Amendment freedom of the press authorized their refusal to appear 
and testify before a grand jury because, if they were forced to 
respond and divulge confidential sources, future informants would 
withhold important, newsworthy information.133 Essentially, if 
journalists could be required to divulge their confidential sources, 
                                                 
127 See id. at 671, 674, 679. 
128 Id. at 679. 
129 Id. at 680. 
130 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. 
131 Id. 
132 See id. 
133 Id. 
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then sources would not come forward with information.134 Without 
the participation of informants, newsworthy information would be 
unavailable for dissemination to the public, placing a burden on the 
free flow of communication in violation of the First Amendment.135 
3.  Why the Branzburg majority refused to recognize a journalists’ 
privilege under the First Amendment 
To arrive at its conclusion that journalists do not have a 
constitutional privilege to keep confidences in the face of a grand jury 
subpoena, the Court first reviewed other, well-accepted limitations on 
the freedom of the press.136 For example, journalists do not have the 
right to violate the liberties of others,137 nor may journalists publish 
any story they wish with impunity.138 Although the journalist’s task is 
to disseminate news to the public, the journalist is not granted special 
access, constitutional or otherwise, to judicial conferences, grand jury 
proceedings, or crime scenes.139 
Despite these limitations, the Majority was compelled to 
acknowledge the importance of the freedom of the press in the 
United States and in American jurisprudence.140 The Court 
recognized that newsgathering is indeed protected by the First 
Amendment.141 In fact, the court asserted that the freedom of the 
press would be eviscerated without the protection of the First 
Amendment.142 However, the Majority determined that Petitioner-
                                                 
134 See id. 
135 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. 
136 See id. at 683-86. 
137 Id. at 683. In Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), the 
Supreme Court held that the Associated Press was bound by the standards of the 
National Labor Relations Act. 
138 Id. at 683-84 (elaborating that, for example, the press may be subject 
to liability for circulating knowing or reckless falsehoods. In such cases, journalists 
may be held responsible for compensatory and punitive damages. Moreover, 
journalists may also be criminally prosecuted for publications of this nature).  
139 Id. at 684-85. Notably, the press may also be prohibited from 
publishing information about trials if such publications threaten to prejudice a 
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.  
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Branzburg, Petitioner-Pappas, and Respondent-Caldwell’s claims did 
not implicate the First Amendment because (1) the journalists were 
not subject to any restraint on the contents of their publications, (2) 
they were not forced to publish stories they wished to conceal, and 
(3) they were not penalized for the contents of their publications.143 
The fact that the journalists were not prohibited from using 
confidential sources in their task of newsgathering was also crucial to 
the Court’s decision.144 Although the journalists’ access to 
confidential informants was not explicitly restricted, the Court did 
not find that requiring journalists to appear before grand juries would 
pose a significant threat to the newsmen’s access to information from 
confidential sources.145 
Rather than recognizing the utility of receiving important 
information from confidential sources and crediting legitimate 
reasons for an informant’s desire for discretion, the Majority’s 
perception was that informants seek confidentiality chiefly to avoid 
criminal prosecution.146 The Majority failed to see the utility in 
transmitting controversial news to the public and failed to give 
adequate import to a journalist’s integrity in his attempts to keep a 
confidence.147 
In situations where the confidential informant is not a 
criminal offender but has knowledge of illegal activity, the Court 
posited that the informant may want to protect his reputation, keep 
his job, or avoid becoming involved in criminal litigation.148 In its list 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 681-82. 
145 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82, 693 (“[T]he evidence fails to 
demonstrate that there would be a significant construction of the flow of news to 
the public. . . .”). 
146 See id. at 691 (“The preference for anonymity of those confidential 
informants involved in actual criminal conduct is presumably a product of their 
desire to escape criminal prosecution, and this preference, while understandable, is 
hardly deserving of constitutional protection”). 
147 See id. at 692 (“Thus, we cannot seriously entertain the notion that the 
First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct 
of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about 
crime than to do something about it[]”). 
148 Id. at 693. 
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of considerations, the Majority also casually noted that the informant 
may fear for his personal safety, but failed to acknowledge the reality 
of this concern and how it could affect the free flow of information 
between informants and the media, and, in turn, between the media 
and the public.149 
Reaching its holding, the Majority was unwavering in 
concluding that the public interest in prosecuting a crime outweighs 
any interest the public may have in receiving information obtained 
from a confidential informant.150 
III.  THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
A.  The European Convention on Human Rights 
Unlike the Branzburg Majority, the Council of Europe has 
recognized that the interest in protecting confidentiality may 
outweigh other concerns, including the prevention of crime.151 The 
Council of Europe’s main purpose is to achieve unity152 between its 
forty-seven member nations.153 In furtherance of its progressive 
goals, the Council of Europe developed the European Convention 
on Human Rights to promote and protect the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of the citizens of its member nations.154 The 
Convention is a binding international agreement,155 and all member 
                                                 
149 Id. 
150 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695. 
151 See generally Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-83413. 
152 European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-
B457-5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf [hereinafter Article 10]. 
153 Impact in 47 Countries, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://human-rights-
convention.org/impact-of-the-european-convention-on-human-rights/ (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2014). 
154 Article 10, supra note 152. 
155 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A GUIDE TO THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT 1998 5 (Dep’t for Constitutional Affairs ed., 3d ed. 2006), 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/peoples-rights/human-rights/pdf/act-studyguide.pdf. 
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nations, including the United Kingdom, have ratified or acceded to 
it.156 
The Convention both enshrines the fundamental rights that 
are guaranteed to all citizens and is legally binding, similar to the Bill 
of Rights of the United States Constitution.157 When an individual 
feels that his rights under the Convention have been violated or 
restricted, he can lodge an application with the European Court of 
Human Rights.158 
1.    A journalistic privilege exists under Article 10 of the Convention 
on Human Rights 
Article 10 of the Convention on Human Rights protects the 
individual’s right to express himself. Specifically, Article 10 provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or 
cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with 
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
                                                 
156 Council of Europe Human Rights Convention Website, 
http://human-rights-convention.org/impact-of-the-european-convention-on-
human-rights/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
157 U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; accord European Convention on Human 
Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. For more on the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its role in European courts, see Frank Murray, 
Boston College’s Defense of the Belfast Project: a Renewed Call for a Researcher’s Privilege to 
Protect Academia, 2 INT’L J. ACAD. RES. BUS. AND SOC. SCI. 1, 18-19 (2012).  
158 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 155, at 5. The 
European Court of Human Rights is located in Strasbourg, France. Before lodging 
an application with the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant must first 
exhaust all available state remedies. The applicant has six months from the date of 
the final domestic court decision to petition the European Court of Human Rights. 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 6 (undated), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Questions_Answers_ENG.pdf. 
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formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights 
of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.159 
Relevantly, the European Court of Human Rights has 
interpreted Article 10 to protect journalists from being compelled to 
disclose the identities of their sources.160 Furthermore, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has specifically 
declared that Article 10 protects a journalist’s right to maintain the 
confidentiality of his sources.161 
2.  Analyzing a cause of action under Article 10. 
Like the Branzburg Court,162 the European Court of Human 
Rights noted in Goodwin v. United Kingdom that compelling journalists 
to disclose the identities of their confidential sources could have a 
chilling effect on the free flow of communication between the media 
and the public.163 However, the European Court of Human Rights 
found the threat to be more palpable, explaining that the important 
public watchdog function served by the press would be undermined 
                                                 
159 Article 10, supra note 152. 
160 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57974.  
161 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 4TH EUROPEAN MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
ON MASS MEDIA POLICY 35 (Council of Europe ed., 1994), 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlo
bGet&InstranetImage=411463&SecMode=1&DocId=517420&Usage=2. The 
Committee of Ministers enumerated this Principle at the 4th European ministerial 
Conference of Mass Media Policy in 1994. 
162 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82, 693. 
163 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500. 
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if journalists were unable to obtain accurate and reliable information 
from sources who wish to remain unnamed.164 
When evaluating a cause of action under Article 10, the 
European Court of Human Rights will first look to the facts of a 
particular case to determine if a public authority has interfered with 
the applicant’s right to freedom of expression guaranteed under 
paragraph 1 of Article 10.165 For example, in Voskuil v. The 
Netherlands, the Court found that the Court of Appeal, a public 
authority, interfered when it ordered the detention of the applicant in 
an attempt to compel him to name his source for a news story.166 
If the Court finds that a public authority has interfered with 
the applicant’s right of expression, then the Court will proceed to 
analyze the facts of the case under paragraph 2 of Article 10 to 
determine if the interference was justified.167 Analysis under the 
second paragraph of Article 10 requires an assessment of three 
prongs.168 First, the Court will determine if law prescribed the 
interference.169 In other words, the Court inquires whether the 
government’s action had a lawful basis in domestic law.170 
Second, if the Court determines that the government’s mode 
of interference had an adequate basis in the relevant domestic law, 
the Court will consider whether the interference pursued a legitimate 
aim.171 According to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, the legitimate aims that justify interference with the 
journalistic freedom of expression are set forth in the exhaustive list 
                                                 
164 Id. at 693. The Branzburg court did not find that requiring disclosure 
would significantly obstruct the free flow of communication. 
165 See id. at 496. 
166 Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-83413.  
167 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 
496. 
168 See Article 10, supra note 152. 
169 See Article 10, supra note 152; see also Goodwin v. United Kingdom 
(No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 496. 
170 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14. 
171 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 
498; See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15. 
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contained in paragraph 2 of Article 10.172 A public authority need 
only pursue one of the enumerated aims to satisfy this prong of the 
test.173 Furthermore, the interference must have been foreseeable by 
the applicant in light of the stipulated restrictions.174 
Finally, the Court must determine whether the interference is 
necessary in a democratic society.175 If the interference is necessary, it 
must also be proportionately calculated to achieve the legitimate aim 
pursued by the restriction.176 If the limiting authority cannot establish 
proportionality and relevance to an extent sufficient to override the 
vital public interest in a free press, then interference is not necessary 
in a democratic society, and the applicant’s rights under Article 10 
will be deemed violated.177 
According to case law from the European Court of Human 
Rights, necessity is a difficult standard for the government to prove 
when it restricts journalistic confidentiality.178 The Council of Europe 
acknowledges that freedom of expression is a cornerstone of 
democracy and declares that protecting the freedom of the press is an 
important and fundamental requirement in this regard.179 
In Goodwin, the European Court of Human Rights expressed 
that the protection of journalistic sources is so essential to a free 
press that an order compelling a journalist to disclose his source’s 
identity must be justified by an overriding requirement in the public 
interest.180 Restrictions on journalistic confidentiality require the 
Court’s strictest scrutiny, and the scales weigh heavily in favor of 
                                                 
172 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 161, at 35. 
173 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 
498. 
174 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 161, at 35.  
175 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 
498-500; Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15. 
176 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500. 
177 See id. at 502-03. 
178 See id. at 500-01. 
179 Id. at 500. 
180 Id. 
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maintaining a free press.181 The test of necessity is fact-intensive, and 
the court must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine 
if the government’s reason for interfering with the freedom of the 
press is both relevant and sufficient.182 
3.  What if the interference was intended to prevent crime? 
The Convention considers the prevention of crime to be a 
potential justification for restricting journalistic confidentiality.183 
Although specified in Article 10, the goal of preventing crime or 
disorder will not always justify a restriction on expression.184 For 
instance, in Voskuil v. The Netherlands, a police officer informed a 
journalist that the police staged a flood to gain access into an 
apartment belonging to a group of individuals who were subsequently 
prosecuted for arms trafficking after the officers’ entry revealed 
weapons.185 
The journalist was called as a trial witness for the defendants, 
but he refused to disclose the identity of the police officer who had 
tipped him off.186 When he refused, he was held in contempt and 
sentenced to a detention for a maximum of 30 days.187 The journalist 
then filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights, 
alleging a violation of his rights under Article 10.188 
Evaluating the journalist’s Article 10 claim, the Court 
accepted the Government’s contention that it interfered to further 
the prevention of crime, a legitimate aim under paragraph 2 of Article 
10.189 The confidential information that the journalist held, the Court 
explained, implicated the integrity of the Netherlands police force 
                                                 
181 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500-
01. 
182 Id. 
183 Article 10, supra note 152. 
184 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15-16. 
185 Id. at 2. 
186 Id. at 15. 
187 Id. at 3. 
188 See id. at 14. 
189 Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15. 
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and contained facts that could secure the defendants a fair trial.190 
Regardless, the Court held that the Government’s interest in the 
informant’s identity could not overcome the journalist’s interest in 
protecting his source’s confidentiality.191 
The Branzburg Court differed fundamentally in its analysis of 
journalistic privilege in the context of criminal activity. While the 
European Court of Human Rights placed great significance on the 
journalist’s integrity and livelihood, as well as the public’s right to 
information,192 the Supreme Court was preoccupied with the source’s 
motives behind his wish to remain confidential.193 The European 
Court of Human Rights is willing to conduct the balancing of 
interests under Article 10, even in the context of high stakes criminal 
cases,194 but the Supreme Court in Branzburg tersely concluded that 
the public’s interest in the prosecution of crime almost always 
outweighs its interest in information.195 
IV.  THE UNITED KINGDOM PRESENTS THE BEST AVAILABLE 
FORUM TO SEEK PROTECTION OF THE BELFAST PROJECT MATERIALS 
A.  The Council of Europe Takes a More Practical Approach 
Toward Protecting Freedom of Expression than the United 
States 
Although Article 10 of the Convention on Human Rights 
specifically protects journalistic freedom of expression,196 academic 
privilege may properly be analogized to a journalistic privilege. Like 
journalists, academic researchers are devoted to collecting and 
analyzing information, then disseminating their findings to an 
audience with the hope that the audience will be enriched as a 
                                                 
190 Id. at 17. 
191 Id. at 18. 
192 See id. 
193 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691. 
194 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 passim. 
195 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695. 
196 See Article 10, supra note 152; Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 
1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483 passim; Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 
passim. 
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result.197 The value of academic research, like the news, hinges on the 
availability, reliability, and accuracy of sources.198 The U.S. Supreme 
Court and the European Court of Human Rights agree that a free 
press is a cornerstone of democracy.199 However, the two authorities 
diverge in their perspectives on how to protect the press’s freedom of 
expression.200 
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court articulated that public 
authorities must not place restrictions on the content of publications, 
force journalists to publish stories against their will, or prohibit the 
use of confidential sources.201 From the Supreme Court’s perspective, 
requiring a journalist to disclose the identity of a confidential source 
does not constitute a prohibition on the use of confidential 
sources.202 Furthermore, the Branzburg Court and the First Circuit203 
determined that compelled disclosure of a confidential source would 
have only a theoretical and uncertain chilling effect on the free 
exchange of information between the press and the public.204 
The European Court of Human Rights takes a more practical 
approach. Rather than accept at face value the fact that journalists 
were not forbidden from obtaining information from confidential 
sources,205 the Court stressed that, under Article 10, a journalist’s 
right to use and keep a confidence is vital to a thriving, free press.206 
                                                 
197 See Murray, supra note 157, at 3-9, for an in depth discussion of the 
functions researchers perform in society, both historically and contemporarily, and 
why an academic privilege is essential to the successful performance of these 
functions. 
198 See Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 714.  
199 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681; Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 
1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500. 
200 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82; but cf. Goodwin v. United Kingdom 
(No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500. 
201 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82. 
202 See id. 
203 See Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 19. 
204 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674 (quoting In re Pappas, 226 N.E.2d at 
302). Although it is quoting the Massachusetts decision here, the Supreme Court 
adopts the proposition in its own analysis and conclusion on appeal. 
205 But cf. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82. 
206 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 
496,500. 
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While the United States federal courts have characterized the chilling 
effect as an uncertain harm,207 the European Court of Human Rights 
more accurately observed that if journalists were compelled to 
divulge confidences, then sources who wish to remain anonymous 
would be discouraged from coming forward with information, 
thereby undermining the ability of the press to present useful and 
reliable news to the public.208 For the press to be truly free, they must 
be protected from the threat of compelled disclosure of their 
confidential sources. 
B. Applying Article 10 Jurisprudence to the Belfast Project 
Litigation 
When assessing whether a public authority’s attempt to 
compel a journalist to disclose a confidential source violates Article 
10, the European Court of Human Rights begins with the 
understanding that a journalist’s right to keep a confidence is so 
essential to democracy that the disclosure must be justified by an 
overriding public interest.209 The law is positioned in favor of 
nondisclosure, and the public authority must satisfy the difficult 
standard of necessity.210 Regarding McIntyre’s application in Belfast, 
the High Court based its analysis—and subsequent denial—of the 
petition on Article 2 of the Convention, not Article 10.211 This 
comment argues that the writ should have been decided in his favor. 
Considering that it was not, the following analysis predicts how the 
Court of Appeal or European Court of Human Rights would review 
McIntyre’s Article 10 claim. 
                                                 
207 See In re Pappas, 226 N.E.2d at 302. For a detailed discussion of cases 
addressing a scholarly privilege in the United States federal courts, see also Murray, 
supra note 157, at 9-18. 
208 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 
500. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. at 500-01. 
211 In the Matter of Application by Anthony McIntyre for Leave to Apply 
for Judicial Review, [2012] NIQB 65 (N. Ir.), http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-
GB/Judicial Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2012/%5B2012%5D 
NIQB 65/j_j_TRE8601FINAL-PUBLISH.htm.  
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1.  Applying the Article 10 test to the facts of the Belfast Project 
Litigation 
a. Did a public authority interfere with the Belfast Project researchers’ 
right to freedom of expression? - Yes, the government of the United 
Kingdom interfered with the rights of Boston College, Moloney, and 
McIntyre to keep the Belfast Project sources and interview materials 
confidential when it requested the materials on behalf of the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland.212 
b. Was the interference prescribed by law? -  Yes, the United 
Kingdom, on behalf of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, was 
acting within the bounds of domestic law when it interfered with the 
researchers’ right to maintain confidentiality because it requested the 
Belfast Project interview materials to pursue a criminal 
investigation.213 
c. Was the interference directed toward the pursuit of a legitimate aim? - 
To meet this prong of the test, the Government must show (1) that it 
subpoenaed the information in pursuit of the public interest214 and 
(2) that the researchers could have foreseen the interference for that 
particular purpose.215 Under Article 10, the prevention of crime or 
disorder is a legitimate aim.216 In the case of the Belfast Project, the 
United Kingdom requested the interviews on behalf of the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland217 because the police suspected that the 
materials contained information essential to the investigation of a 
variety of crimes.218 Taken at face value, the prevention and 
prosecution of criminal activity are clearly legitimate pursuits for the 
                                                 
212 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3; cf. Voskuil v. Netherlands, 
2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14. 
213 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3. 
214 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15; Goodwin v. 
United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 498. 
215 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 161, at 35.  
216 Article 10, supra note 152. 
217 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 1. 
218 Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.  
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good of the public. However, stating a legitimate motive does not 
necessarily justify an interference with the right to free expression.219 
Foreseeability on the parts of Moloney and McIntyre is more 
challenging to establish. Considering the highly political nature of 
“The Troubles” and the amnesty provision under the Good Friday 
Agreement,220 the researchers could have reasonably concluded that 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland would not attempt to 
prosecute cold cases, such as the 1972 murder and abduction of 
McConville.221 Furthermore, Moloney and McIntyre have described 
the McConville situation as a “longstanding ‘non-investigation,’” 
further supporting the proposition that they could not have foreseen 
that the United Kingdom would request the interviews to inquire into 
40-year-old crimes.222 
d. Was the interference necessary in a democratic society? - An analysis 
under Branzburg would have ended when the Government established 
that its purpose for compelling disclosure was to prevent and 
prosecute criminal activity.223 However, the European Court of 
Human Rights takes the analysis a step further. In fact, the European 
Court of Human Rights performs the very test that the petitioners 
argued for in Branzburg: the government must show that its interest in 
disclosure is compelling enough to outweigh the value of the 
fundamental right to expression.224 In making this showing, the 
Government must also establish that the level of interference is 
proportionately calculated to achieve the legitimate aim pursued and 
that the information is not reasonably available from an alternative 
source.225 
                                                 
219 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 
502-03. 
220 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26-27. Under the terms 
of the Good Friday Agreement, almost all prisoners, including many who had been 
convicted of murder, were released by the British government. 
221 Id.  
222 Id. at 26. 
223 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695. 
224 See id. at 680; cf. Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 483, 502-03. 
225 Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15. 
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This approach is similar to that adopted in Branzburg; 
however, the European Court of Human Rights places greater weight 
on the journalist’s right to nondisclosure.226 Moreover, the totality of 
the circumstances must be carefully considered, with weight placed in 
favor of protecting the right to freedom of expression.227 Regarding 
the Belfast Project litigation, the U.S. District Court for 
Massachusetts determined that the requested information was not 
available to be readily obtained from another, less sensitive source.228 
Considering the secrecy shrouding the paramilitary groups involved 
in “The Troubles,”229 the courts of the United Kingdom would likely 
reach the same conclusion. 
The main point of contention, however, is on the 
proportionality of the request.230 The United Kingdom sought 
information to aid in the investigation of crimes; however, the crimes 
in question occurred in 1972—almost 40 years prior to the request.231 
Additionally, the Police Service of Northern Ireland elected not to 
pursue this particular investigation for a long period of time.232 
Moreover, pursuant to the terms of the Good Friday Agreement 
between the United Kingdom and the IRA, many prisoners, 
                                                 
226 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 
500-01.; but cf. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695 ([W]e cannot accept the argument that 
the public interest in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified 
sources must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting 
those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the 
commission of such crimes in the future.”). 
227 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500-
01. 
228 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 456. 
229 See id. at 441. The code of silence is evident through the extreme 
measures taken by the Belfast Project researchers to ensure that the participants’ 
identities would be concealed. 
230 Anthony McIntyre himself claimed that the compelled disclosure 
would disproportionately interfere with his right to life under Article 2 and his right 
to prevent the disclosure of information received in confidence under Article 10. 
Statement Filed Pursuant to Order 53, Rule(3)(2)(a) of the Rules of the Court of 
Judicature (NI) 1980 at ¶ 3(b)-(d), In re Application by Anthony McIntyre for Leave 
to Apply for Judicial Review, [2012] NIQB 65 (N. Ir.), 
http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/99166414?access_key=key-
jadvo5q2krzoyln48yc&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=scroll. 
231 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6. 
232 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26. 
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including those convicted of murder during “The Troubles,” have 
been released.233 
Contrary to the current, ongoing criminal activity at issue at 
the time of the Branzburg litigation,234 the criminal activity at issue in 
the Belfast Project litigation was long over, and the actors were given 
amnesty in furtherance of the political peace process.235 The 
participants came forward to share the ghosts of their past with the 
hope of providing insight and preventing future harm.236 In fact, if 
the United Kingdom truly wishes to prevent future harm, crime, and 
disorder, then it should strive to protect the participants’ identities.237 
The IRA, of which McIntyre, Hughes, Price, and many other 
participants were members, enforces a strict code of silence.238 If the 
interviewees are revealed to have breached this code, their own safety 
and the safety of the researchers involved in the Belfast Project likely 
will be threatened.239 
Furthermore, the inevitable chill to the free flow of 
information is startling. Although the aim of prosecuting and 
preventing crime is venerable, the consequences are too great to 
justify a violation of the researchers’ right to keep their sources 
confidential. If the disclosure is compelled, the United Kingdom may 
have clues about their 40-year-old investigation; however, in so 
doing, they will have placed their own citizens in harm’s way, 
compromised the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland, 
inhibited the success of valuable research to prevent future conflict, 
                                                 
233 Id. at 26-27. 
234 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. passim. 
235 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6; see also Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26-27. 
236 See Request from U.K., 683 F.3d at 4 (noting that this was the goal of 
the Belfast Project: to understand the minds of those engaged in violent conflict, 
with the hope of preventing it in the future).  
237 See Trs. of Boston Coll.,831 F.Supp.2d at 441 (explaining that tensions 
still exist in Northern Ireland). 
238 See id. (noting that interviewees conditioned their participation on 
strict promises of confidentiality in order to protect their safety); see also Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9 (explaining that IRA members are forbidden from 
sharing anything about IRA membership or operations with anyone, at penalty of 
punishment at the hands of the Army).  
239 See Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441. 
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and tarnished the reputation of the Belfast Project researchers.240 
Therefore, compelled disclosure of the Belfast Project participants’ 
identities is not necessary in a democratic society. Conclusively, 
courts in the United Kingdom, which are bound by Article 10, should 
find that the researchers’ Article 10 rights were violated. 
V.  FULFILLING THE UNITED KINGDOM’S REQUEST CONTRAVENES 
PUBLIC POLICY 
If the researchers cannot protect the confidentiality of the 
interview materials through the European court system, Article 3 of 
the US-UK MLAT, which lists limitations on assistance, presents 
another solution.241 Under Article 3, the United States may refuse its 
assistance if the Attorney General, the treaty’s designated Central 
Authority for the U.S., determines that the request, if granted, would 
impair essential American interests or contravene United States 
public policy.242 In this case, the United Kingdom’s request would 
compromise the peace process in Northern Ireland, put the lives of 
many at risk, and jeopardize the success of future academic 
endeavors.243 Considering that the United States played a key role in 
the Northern Ireland peace process and has a vested interest in the 
safety and progress of British and American citizens, fulfilling the 
United Kingdom’s request would impair the essential interests of the 
United States and contravene public policy.244 
Because the Belfast Project implicates foreign relations, it falls 
under the purview of Secretary of State John Kerry. Secretary Kerry 
has evinced a special interest in the Belfast Project litigation, both as 
                                                 
240 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9 passim. 
241 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., art. 3, 
Jan. 6, 1994, T.I.A.S No. 96-1202, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176269.pdf [hereinafter US-UK 
MLAT]. 
242 Id. art. 3.1(a), art. 2.2. 
243 See Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1 (expressing concern about the 
consequences of fulfilling the United Kingdom’s request under the US-UK 
MLAT).  
244 See id. (acknowledging that the Good Friday Agreement was signed 
under the “enormous leadership” of President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair). 
 
2014 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 3:1 
358 
a Senator of Massachusetts and as the Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.245 In January 2012, he urged former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to work with British authorities to 
revoke their request for the Belfast Project materials.246 Senator Kerry 
was concerned that the United Kingdom’s request would disturb the 
fragile Northern Ireland peace process and offend the spirit of the 
Good Friday Agreement because any crimes recounted in the 
interviews would have occurred prior to the accords.247 In addition to 
the inherent political dangers, Senator Kerry also acknowledged the 
threats to the Belfast Project participants and academia in general: “It 
is my great hope that the academic integrity of these documents is 
maintained and that these transcripts remain confidential because for 
some this has become a matter of life and death.”248 
According to Senator Kerry, the US-UK MLAT is a “vital” 
instrument; however, it was “never meant to be used as a method of 
reaching far back into a difficult history and perhaps eroding a 
delicate truce that could lead to more lives being lost.”249 Based on 
his earlier statements, Secretary Kerry has acknowledged that 
fulfillment of the United Kingdom’s request would contravene 
important public policy concerns and impair the United States’s 
                                                 
245 See Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1; Letter from John Kerry, Mass. Senator 
and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., to Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of 
State (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://htmlimg2.scribdassets.com/9nepmj1w8w1d29hd/images/1-c3ae96f326.jpg 
[hereinafter Letter from John Kerry]. 
246 Letter from John Kerry, supra note 245. Secretary Kerry is not alone in 
his efforts. Other members of Congress who have written to Secretary Clinton on 
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interest in a peaceful Northern Ireland.250 To protect the integrity of 
the Belfast Project and the lives of those involved, Secretary Kerry 
should work toward an agreeable resolution with the United 
Kingdom that does not involve compelled disclosure of the 
participants’ identities. 
Although declining to enforce the United Kingdom’s request 
would not create a constitutional privilege for academic researchers, it 
would be a major step toward recognition of such a right. The 
executive branch would demonstrate that the protection of 
confidentiality in academic research could outweigh the prosecution 
of crimes. Additionally, the decision would further legitimize 
endeavors like the Belfast Project as important tools in American 
culture, moving the standard of protection of researchers closer to 
that for journalists. 
CONCLUSION 
The time is ripe to recognize an academic privilege in the 
United States. In their petition for certiorari, Moloney and McIntyre 
indicated that the circuit courts have inconsistently applied Branzburg, 
disagreeing whether and to what extent the First Amendment 
protects against compelled disclosure of confidential information.251 
When the Belfast Project litigation was before the First Circuit 
initially, Circuit Judge Torruella explained that he concurred in the 
judgment of the First Circuit only because he was compelled to do so 
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Branzburg.252 
Although the Belfast Project will not be the vehicle for the 
Supreme Court to revisit its holding in Branzburg, the controversy 
surrounding the project indicates that the trend, both nationally and 
internationally, is in favor of affording more, not less, protection to 
journalists, academics, and other professionals who promise 
                                                 
250 See Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1; Letter from John Kerry, supra note 
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251 See id. at 13. 
252 Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 20 (Torruella, C.J., concurring). 
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confidentiality in exchange for information on important matters of 
public interest.253 
After examining academic privilege through the lens of the 
Belfast Project, it is evident that compelling academicians to divulge 
their confidential sources will inevitably and significantly obstruct the 
free flow of information between researchers and their participants, 
thereby depriving the public of valuable information. The protection 
of academic confidentiality agreements is essential in two important 
ways. Firstly, when individuals are encouraged to share their life 
experiences in a safe, academic environment, researchers are able to 
transmit the wisdom they glean to the public. Enlightening society 
affords future generations the ability to learn from the mistakes of 
the past and craft a better future. Simply put, if researchers cannot 
promise anonymity to those informants who require it, then 
informants will be hesitant to participate in studies, and researchers 
will never be able to gather true and accurate information to 
disseminate to the public. 
Secondly, the safety of researchers and their sources hinges 
on their ability to enter into and enforce confidentiality agreements. 
As this comment has explained in its discussion of the Belfast 
Project, research participants put themselves at risk when they share 
their experiences regarding high-stakes, controversial, and dangerous 
topics. Furthermore, academicians who conduct such projects also 
expose themselves to peril. For endeavors like the Belfast Project, 
confidentiality is virtually mandatory, not optional, for many research 
participants. When considering claims such as those of Moloney and 
McIntyre, courts should conduct the appropriate balancing test with 
the understanding that an academic’s right to maintain confidentiality 
is essential to a thriving, free society. If courts fail to do so, policy 
makers must use the tools at their disposal to protect this vital 
interest. 
 
                                                 
253 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 14. 
